erraticwisdom

Comments

1. really interesting.
   It reminded me of some thoughts on Alan Watts’ “The Way Of Zen”*, discussing differences between western and eastern languages and its further implications in a conception of the world
   As an example he asks: “what happens to my fist when i open my hand?”. I think this question shares similar problems with Theseo’s.
   In english there is a clear distinction between nouns and verbs but this distinction is just a grammatical convention, and not always logical. In chinese, on the other hand, there are a lot of words which act as nouns and verbs at the same time. For a chinese thinker there is no problem in realizing that the Ship of Theseo is a process as well as an entity.
   http://www.amazon.com/Way-Zen-Alan-W-Watts/dp/0375705104

   jesús gollonet

   Nov 25, 08:13 AM #

2. Consider that, to our knowledge, everything is comprised of the same fundamental building blocks, be they strings, quarks, or something else. A proton and an electron separately are just separate particles; but arranged such that the weak nuclear force keeps them dancing together, they become hydrogen. In this configuration, there emerges a different kind of behavior, in that they interact with other partners differently than when they were individual particles.

   Since the only thing that’s changed is their arrangement, the pattern of their interaction, then it might be thought that the pattern itself is the defining characteristic, and not the constituent pieces. Of course, a similar pattern combining two electrons would be a different thing, so the pattern is not of sole importance; but it needn’t be any particular proton and electron, but there is a specific pattern which results in a given atomic behavior.

   Extrapolating, then, it might be that the Ship of Theseus is not so much a specific collection of materials, but rather the pattern of their relationship. If that’s the case, then, by the end of your post, we actually have two legitimate Ships of Theseus. Of course, if we restrict this label only to the item comprised of parts of the vessel on which Theseus actually traveled, then we must say that there’s a continuum of “Ship of Theseus,” such that the vessel on which he traveled, as he traveled, was at the extreme (“100% Ship of Theseus”), and there can be nothing be degradation down the curve from there. If there were no even mere splinters lost among all the disassembled pieces, and assuming they were reassembled to match their original configuration exactly, then we have only one Ship of Theseus. So, then, it’s a game of definitions.

   We sidestep this issue as regards human rights and ownership, but it could become very sticky. Depending on how accurate are the second- or third-hand accounts I’ve heard, the entirety of our bodies is replaced, to the last cell, over the course of roughly 7 years. Are we then still ourselves, or are we a different person than that person 7 years our junior? Abstracting this to the discussion of patterns as the defining characteristics, even these change over time, e.g. the arrangements of cells, the arrangements (and presence) of tissues, the neural paths which constitute patterns of cognitive reasoning, etc. In this regard, the act of learning might be called destructive of our personality, because it is a refining, culling, and growth of the patterns of our cognitive processes. There is still something intrinsic to the person even in the face of such changes, which at least feels constant. I would call it by some mathematical label (something along the lines of “characteristic function” or “determinant” or the like), a pointer to the idea that maybe the changes to our patterns of existence merely add constants or low-dimension variables to the function which defines us. Others, less apt to mathematize things, might call it a soul. I’m not sure which is more appropriate.

   Daniel Black

   Dec 17, 09:38 AM #

3. This is a fallatial question – a contectual error rather than paradox. Basically, the question is not a philospohical one, it is a legal one. Which ship do we consider to be Theseus’s? Whichever one he agreed with the ship restorer.

   You may then say, “forget the ‘Ship of Theseus’” tag. Lets call the ship “Minerva” and change the question to “which ship is ‘Minerva’‘”. This is still a legal question. The ‘“Minerva” designation is just a shorthand way of saying “The collection of wood, rope, sails and stuff that currently resides in xyz and is owned by Theseus”, which is a shorthand version of an entire catalogue of the ship and its constituents and legal status. It doesn’t really have a name or an identity – it is merely a convention we accept. This is true of all things, axes, cars, ships, planets, suns, universes. When this question is asked, it is not a question about reality – its a question about conventions.

   Essentially, the answer to the question is “Either, both or neither – depending on the conventions we have agreed to use”. If there is any disagreement amongst observers, this is just a difference in the convention they are using. Sometimes it needs to go to a third party adjudicator to decide what is a “fair” convention. But this is still a purely subjective convention. It says nothing about the nature of reality.

   Alex Houseman

   Feb 27, 06:48 AM #

4. Alex:

   Your comment seems to take a very strict position on the identity of the ship, it is the Ship of Theseus only if it has these specific constituent parts.

   Most people, however, do not consider this to be the case. For example, if your car needs a new battery and you have it replaced, you wouldn’t (typically) say that you have an entirely new car. Rather, you have the same car, the Car of Alex with a new battery. So, the problem arises when you try to have a non-arbitrary designation of when it’s considered a new “thing” – either when a single part is replaced (which seems counterintuitive) or when all parts are replaced.

   So, it does seem to be a question of identity, it’s what we refer to when we use the term “Ship of Theseus”

   Thame

   Feb 27, 10:29 AM #

5. Hi Thane

   Both yes and no to the strict identity. I recognise the fact that we have a convention that allows a shorthand description (a name). This is why you say “typically” – this is our accepted convention. However, In reality the only “name” that really defines an object is either the object itself or an exhaustive description of it (don’t get me started on the possibility of that) – both of which show that Alex’s Car is no longer Alex’s car if the battery is changed (but of course it is by our convention…).

   I think this is fairly self evident for objects that only have subjective identity or continuity (ie every object in the universe). Where it gets more interesting is when you consider something that each of has independent evidence of identity and continuity – ourselves. Bearing in mind that all the cells in my body are changed every seven years, in what sense am I still “Alex”. Even simpler than that, in what sense am I still “Alex” from moment to moment. Damned if I know.

   Alex Houseman

   Feb 28, 07:10 AM #